Hardware 1: The Italian Hacker Crackdown Peter Ludlow ludlow@well.sf.ca.us Draft 2, Sept. 8, 1994 The Italian corner of the electronic frontier resembles the American territory in certain respects, but has its own characteristic features. Internet access is rare, so Italians tend to rely on smaller networks, such as Fidonet and a number of exclusively Italian networks for the sharing of information. The Italian territory also has a rhythm of its own. The main Italian networks, CyberNet, PeaceLink, P-net, etc., do not bristle with the same high octane flame wars one finds on American bulletin boards, nor do they boast the same frenetic swapping of technical information and programs. Much more prominent are exchanges of information on topics like antifascism, and anti-mafia, the latest assaults by neo-fascists on African workers, the latest on AIDS research, and the shifting political currents in the ex-Yugoslavia. Even the non-political boards gravitate to discussions of Hakim Bey's _Temporary_Autonomous _Zones_, or the latest from the keyboards of Bruce Sterling and Howard Rheingold. It is, as a rule, a much more mellow territory. That mellow atmosphere was punctuated violently on May 11, 1994, when the Guardia di Finanza (Italy's "finance police") was unleashed in a massive operation codenamed "hardware1". The news began hitting the Italian CyberNet network immediately.{1} >From: Marco >To: All > >This afternoon the Guardia di Finanza came with a warrant to >search the house and look for material "designed for the >duplication of software" illegally, etc. The investigation was >initiated, it seems, because the name of my BBS was found on the >list of someone that I don't know, it seems to me in Modena, >charging with the violation of copyright laws etc.... > >They wanted me to give them the addresses of my "correspondents," >and I did so with pleasure. I gave them the nodelist for Fido!!! I >really want to see what they do with 31,000 nodes scattered over >the entire world! >From: Gianluca >To: All > >Also at Riccardo's they seized everything. It seems that this is >what we we were talking about some time ago on the effects of the >new law on copyright and on their interpretations really had the >intent to strangle the BBSs. A BBS with free access is a risk. >[...] By the next day real horror stories were starting to hit CyberNet. >From: Giovanni >To: All >Re: Help :-( > >Yesterday afternoon (Wednesday the 11th) agents of the Guardia >di Finanza presented themselves to me at my house, they seized all >the pcs and extensions that I have in my house. The really took >everything, from the telephone chords to the little sack of >disketts to the booklet with the telephone numbers of my friends. >[...] >If there would be someone that could give me a hand to lift me out >of this situation, I would be eternally grateful. I really need >help..." By Friday the 13th, news was being broadcast to the internet from the few Italians with internet connections. >From ita.it!staff Fri May 13 05:32:27 1994 >Return-Path: > >[...] > >things are getting really bad here... > >On Wednesday, 11th of May, at 3:30 pm, the italian Feds came >into my house while I was out of town for a consulting business. >They went into my bedroom and seized all my equipment, >diskettes, tapes. This action was part of a nationwide raid >against software piracy that hit some other 40+ FIDONET >sites (yes, they seem to have used a Fido nodelist to find out >about sites to investigate). Needless to say, I didn't even have >DOS on my disk drives, let alone any copyrighted software. >Anyway, they have now all my work of the latest 5 (five) >years, including all backup copies of UniBoard and related >stuff.. and I don't know if I will be ever able to have all my >stuff back. ... > >Please, forward this to the alt.bbs.* groups, since I do not have >news access here, and am also missing all the email addresses >of my customers and friends.. > >Wish me luck, > >Rick > _\\|//_ > ( 0-0 ) > ------------------------------- > o00--(_)--00o---------------------------------- > Riccardo Pizzi, SysAdmin Tel: +39 71 204046 > I.T.A. Informatica e Fax: +39 71 2073033 > Tecnologie Avanzate s.r.l. E-Mail: staff@ita.it >----------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Fabrizio Sala >Subject: The Italian Crackdown?? > To: BBS-L@SAUPM00.ing.unico.it >Cc: eff@eff.org > >Hello. I'm the Sysop of one of the BBSs in Italy. > >I'm writing this message in this list to inform you, the BBS >community, of what is going on in Italy. > >Some days ago,starting from Pesaro (Italy), our Police started a >large [inquisition against] many [amateur] BBSs, mostly connected >to the main networks ... > >They're getting everything they can find: computers, monitors, >drives, hard disks, floppy, cdrom, streamer tapes ... everything, >without looking if they are or not in any way "illegal" ... > > Generally, every network in Italy is now full of holes... and many >of us lost everything "in the name of the anti-piracy"... > > Nobody of us is doing anything in any way illegal, but they are >still getting everything... > >They got more than 50 BBS and Police's work is still going on... > >I hope that everyone diffuses this message ... or in any way tells >everybody what's going on ... > >...and if you have any way to help us...please do it! We made our >best to make the italian telecommunication scene working... they >are killing us! > >See you later... if they don't get me! > >______ end fwd ______ If the reports were to be believed, the appetite of the Guardia di Finanza for hardware and peripherals was insatiable. Everything was being confiscated from CDs, to broken terminals, to, in at least one case, a multi-plug electrical adapter.{2} Just how severe was the crackdown? Estimates vacillated wildly. some said 50 BBSs were affected. Some said over 100. Others indicated that hundreds of arrest warrants had been served. It was also unclear what the geographical reach of the crackdown had been. Initial reports put the affected BBSs in Pesaro, Modena, Bologna, Ancona, Pisa, Milano. The affected networks, in addition to Fidonet, included Euronet, Ludonet, P-Net, and CyberNet.{3} It soon became apparent that the attack had two prongs -- one coordinated by the regional office of the Guardia di Finanza in Turin (Torino) -- generally in Northwestern Italy, the second coordinated by the Prosecutor of Pesaro, in Eastern Central Italy. In a press release issued on May 25th, the Turin regional office of the Guardia di Finanza claimed that it had focussed on only14 persons, and that more specifically, >The law enforcement operation, managed by the pool of >Prosecutors based in the local office under the direction of Dr. >Cesare Parodi, brought to a series of searchings that ended with >the legal report to penal Authorities of 14 people operating in >Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria, Marche, Abruzzo. Several >hardware and software pieces were seized, for a value of more than >4 billion of lire (about US $2,5 million), including: > - 17 personal computers; > - 13,690 floppy disks of illegally copied software; > - 8 CD-ROM disks; > - 27 modems; > - 4 devices for illegal use of telephone lines; > - several computer boards and parts; > - many software manuals."{4} The list itself raised eyebrows. Why CD-ROMs? And if they were pirated, why only 8? Why software manuals, unless they were copies of manuals? Justifying these busts by the Turin prosecutor Parodi, the following justification was offered in an official statement. >Receiving the ECC proposal n. 250/91 in defence of copyrighted >computer software, the Italian bill n. 518/92 establishes penal >charges against any commercialization of illegally copied >programs, in addition to the crime of great fiscal evasion. >Following such legal pattern, recently the Finance and Fiscal Police >conducted a vast operation throughout the country. This >operation enabled us to crack an intricate web of "telecom pirates" >who, using computer connections with similar north-american >"hackers", were making many illegal copies of stolen original >software, selling them at very cheap prices. Thus incorrectly filling >the commercial market with illegal products, this conduct broke >the law n. 633/41 in protection of copyright materials. The Custom >and Finance Police were surprised to find out that the "pirates" >were using high advanced technology devices - including >sophisticated personal computers, satellite communications, false >"call-card" to use north-american private phone company nets. >Because of previous experiences on these issues and of meticulous >investigations, Fiscal Police officials were able to infiltrate into >the suspicious world of those computer super-experts."{5} Just a few weeks later, the Prosecutor of Pesaro offered the *these* numbers on his own much vaster operation in Central Italy.{6} >159 computers confiscated >110,000 diskettes "containing programs of dubious origin" >confiscated >122 arrest warrants for illicit copying of software. Just to put these numbers in perspective, according to Bruce Sterling, in the notorious U.S. crackdown, Operation Sundevil, forty-two computer systems were seized.{7} Of those, Sterling estimates that only 25 were actually in operation. As Sterling notes, this would constitute one-tenth of one percent of all the boards active in the United States at that time. By contrast, some estimates claim that a full one-third of all the BBSs in Italy were confiscated. Clearly this operation had dwarfed the haul from Operation Sundevil, both in numerical terms, and in terms of effect on the on-line community. And the Italian operation wasn't finished! As remaining networks scrambled to get the word out, one of the leading players was the PeaceLink network with its central node in Taranto. PeaceLink was a non-profit network of bulletin boards established almost exclusively for the exchange of information about anti-mafia and antifascist work, and had been one of few reliable lines of communication with the peoples of ex-Yugoslavia.{8} With its long tradition of left-leaning activism, it quite naturally took up the charge exchanging information and helping in the organization of meetings on the crackdown which were to be held in Rome and Pesaro at the end of June. On May 23, Bernardo Parella distributed an electronic update on the crackdown, announcing, among other things, that "PeaceLink has set up a defense committee news center in Taranto." Then the other shoe dropped. On June 3, three weeks after the initial wave of crackdowns, the finance police raided the Taranto node of PeaceLink, confiscated its equipment and files, effectively silencing the network. Three days later, in a radio interview, the head of PeaceLink, Gugliemo Pugliese explained what had happened. "... last Thursday, at 5:00 PM, I had just returned home; I heard the door bell, I opened, and there was the "finanza" (finance police). They presented themselves, gave me notice of a search warrant and an "avviso di garanzia" (arrest warrant) for me and my wife. At this, let's say, I became frightened by all this, because my name is fairly well noted and known, in measure from my activity with Peacelink, an activity which is voluntary at every level... to see the finance police in my house made me a little bit ill. They notified me of this, and began searching the entire apartment, and not only; let's say that it was focused above all on PeaceLink, on the network; and therefore on software in general. At which they finished at 11:00 PM, therefore from 5:00 to 11:00 between various searches, questions.... Believe it or not, my check book was sequestered, a series of things; they blocked the central system, which is here in my apartment, of the whole PeaceLink network. "{9} This time, the haul from the 5 hour search was the PC and the modem running the BBS as well as bank-account receipts and 174 floppy disks - they left behind computer monitor. By this point nerves were frazzled all over the Italian BBS community. On June 12, I communicated with Andrea Sannuci, sysop of Senza Confine, one of the key CyberNet nodes. >Just a few days ago the host of the peacelink network was >confiscated on the orders of the Taranto prosecutor. At this moment >the true motives of the action are still unknown, but as you well >understand, they precisely attacked a central node of a network -- >An action that, only with difficulty, could not be considered >political. > >The peacelink network, after a night of frenetic telephoning >among all the various nodes scattered throughout Italy is back up, >but certainly it was a terrible experience. ... >It is certainly not easy for me to describe what we are going >through at present. It is something that involves us and at the >same time it is beyond us in that we cannot yet understand with >what type of logic this is all taking place. Consider that just in >my region (Marche) there were about 10 BBSs active and >functioning. Now the only one remaining is mine [...]"{10} Although affairs in Italy had risen to a state of urgency, the response from the on-line community in the United States ranged from disinterest to concerned resignation. A topic was opened to discuss the problem on the WELL, but few other systems seemed to be aware of the problem. Even on Mindvox, I was unable to locate a single reference to the crackdown. As for organizations dedicated to on-line rights, the CPSR did the best job of opening communications with the Italian community. Although the Australian EFF offered assistance, the United States EFF (in the middle of Clipper Chip and other battles) did not issue a single official statement on the Italian crackdown. Meanwhile, the United States press either ignored the crackdown, or treated it bemusedly as a legitimate anti-piracy operation which simply looked bad for Italy's new right wing government. So, for example, in an article titled "Nabbing the Pirates of Cyberspace" _Time_ magazine's Philip Elmer-DeWitt wrote the following: >The sweep, when it came last month, was swift and thorough. >Dozens of Italian customs officers fanned out across the country >and began pounding on doors in Milan, Bologna, Pisa and Pesaro. >Their target: a loose alliance of computer bulletin-board operators >suspected of trafficking in stolen software. By last week, >according to unofficial reports, the Italian police had shut down >more than 60 computer bulletin boards and seized 120 computers, >dozens of modems and more than 60,000 floppy disks. In their >zeal, say the suspects, some officers of the Guardia di Finanza >grabbed anything even remotely high-tech, including audiotapes, >telephone-answering machines and multiplug electrical outlets. > >It was the most dramatic move yet in a determined - and some >say increasingly desperate -- effort by governments around the >world to curb the spread of software piracy. The unauthorized >copying of computer programs by American businesses alone >deprived software publishers of $1.6 billion last year, a figure >that swells to nearly $7.5 billion when overseas markets are >included. ''Industry's loss on a global basis is staggering,'' says >Ken Wasch, head of the U.S. Software Publishers Association. > >But government actions to stem the losses may be causing more >problems than they solve. The Italian campaign, which began just >as the newly elected right-wing government of media tycoon >Silvio Berlusconi took office, hit largely left-leaning bulletin >boards. And it is seen by some Italians as an ill-disguised attempt >to suppress free speech on a troublesome new medium."{11} Did the crackdown merely *seem* to some Italians to be an attempt to suppress free speech? Was it really an honest effort to "curb the spread of software piracy"? Clearly, Italy had had a huge problem with piracy. However, the piracy had not been limited to software. Piracy of records, videotapes, and even books has been widespread. For example, According to _Billboard_ magazine for example, by 1993 record piracy in the Italian market amounted to $83 million dollars annually{12} Although perhaps not the largest piracy problem in Italy, software piracy was nevertheless significant. But a caveat is necessary here. Italy earned its reputation not from pirated software that was distributed through bulletin boards, but rather by software piracy that was encouraged by Italy's largest corporations. For example, in 1989, _Datamation_ reported on efforts by BSA (Business Software Association{13}) to crack down on piracy by Italian corporations. In some cases, small raids were carried out with the help of local police authorities. One raid which took place at the headquarters of the Montedison industrial group discovered that 90% of the Lotus and Ashton-Tate software found on workstations were allegedly unauthorized copies.{14} In the words of Massimo Moggi, senior analyst at the Nomos Sistemi consulting firm, "In-house software piracy isn't always just a widespread random activity in some Italian firms. It's often a systematic procedure, institutionalized within the IS division."{15} According to Moggi, in some cases software manuals were copied, neatly bound, and turned out with the company logo on the cover. Nor were the corporations particularly repentant. According to _Datamation_, attempts by BSA to negotiate with Montedison before and after the raid were rebuffed with a request that BSA "stop sending such invitations." Some observers have held that in an environment with such widespread piracy, it is natural to suppose that pirate boards would be widespread. However one can also make the case that just the opposite is true. The widespread *institutionalized* piracy in Italy may have made *underground* pirate bulletin boards unnecessary. Who needs a pirate board when one can get the software for free at work? None of this is to deny that there were pirate BBSs in Italy at the time of the crackdown. The question is whether 1/3 of the boards in Italy were really engaged in piracy. More to the point, were any of the genuine pirate boards caught up in Operation Hardware 1? Of course if piracy is defined broadly enough -- for example as being in possession at least one piece of unregistered software, most of the affected boards would probably fall under the definition. (For that matter, most people reading this article would count as pirates.) Some of the boards were running unregistered BBS software. No doubt others had illegally copied programs here and there which had been uploaded. But of course when we think of pirate boards we think of boards established with the exchange of warez as its primary purpose, and here it seems that the "haul" from the crackdown was embarrassingly small. In fact, of the 100+ systems confiscated by the prosecutor of Pesaro, no specific evidence of wrongdoing has been made public except for two young boys which were allegedly the "center" of a huge piracy ring. As if to apologize for lack of results, the prosecutor remarked to _La_Repubblica_ that "there are hundreds of judicial reports, dozens of prosecutors that must occupy themselves with the local parts of the investigation beginning in Pesaro last March and the shadow of a computer piracy, all of which still has to be identified, that **probably** struck important private data banks."{16} [emphasis mine]. The embarrassingly slim haul from such a widespread operation is difficult to understand. It would have been a simple matter to log onto these systems and check for piracy first, or at least find an informant who had spotted pirated materials. Even in the notoriously clumsy Operation Sundevil, all the boards had been examined beforehand (if only by informants).{17} Yet there is no evidence that even these basic steps were taken in Italy. Rather there appears to have been a widespread seizing of BBSs without any evidence that they carried pirated software. Genuine pirate boards no doubt escaped this noisy and destructive sweep. This last point has not been lost on the Italian BBS community. In a remarkable interview published in the electronic journal _Corriere Telematico_, Gianluca Neri put precisely this question to the Pesaro Prosecutor. >Neri: What many system operators affirm is that by having hit >innocent boards first, the investigation was helpful to the real >pirates, who had all the time necessary to delete or hide all the >software they had which was protected by copyright. > >Pedrocchi: I don't believe so. We acted in relation to the data that >was in our possession.{18} Of course the bust of PeaceLink is the hardest to make sense of if this operation was really aimed at curbing piracy. PeaceLink had explicit policies against software piracy and had campaigned against such piracy. It contained no pirated materials. It had little in the way of warez period. Moreover, the idea that it trafficked in pirated software and kept trafficking in it a full three weeks after the first wave of the crackdown, indeed while the Taranto node was running an information center on the crackdown, is just not credible. One thing is clear, if the true targets of the crackdown were software pirates, then the crackdown misfired badly. But what *was* the aim of this operation? What could the motives possibly have been? Three different theories have emerged to answer this question. According to the first theory, the operation really was intended to be a crackdown on piracy. It was simply a case of incredibly ignorant and incompetent prosecutors engaged in an electronic Keystone Cop routine. According to the second theory, the government really had the goal of clearing out BBSs to make room for larger media interests to start homesteading Italy's electronic frontier -- i.e. the government was working on behalf of electronic "Robber Barons". According to the third theory, it was an attempt by the Italian government to crack down on what it perceived as dangerous political opposition. I'll take up each of these theories in turn. Theory 1: the Keystone Cop theory It has been argued by many in the BBS community that the prosecutors were merely aimlessly following leads from a single piracy center. As the prosecutor himself (Pedrocchi) reconstructed the investigation: "We began on the cue of the general command of the financial police, from a 'center' in Pesaro for the sale of programs that were illicitly duplicated. Following the contacts that this 'center' had with diverse data banks we identified the other suspects. Now, examining the material, we are ascertaining if these latter data banks committed offenses."{19} Why were they proceeding in such a counterproductive manner? Perhaps the prosecutors were in over their heads. Pedrocchi himself has described himself as "[b]eing ignorant, knowing absolutely nothing of computers..."{20} Others have observed that the eagerness of the prosecutors to claim ignorance should make us suspicious, particularly since claiming ignorance is a time honored strategy for disguising genuine motives. So, was this merely a case of Keystone Cops stumbling along with only the help of a Fido nodelist? Many are skeptical. Even the most computer-ignorant prosecutor must know that merely connecting with a pirate BBS does not make one another pirate BBS. That would be like saying that everyone who comes into contact with a bank robber is a bank robber. It is hard to imagine that any Italian prosecutor, much less the Guardia di Finanza, genuinely held such a simplistic view of guilt by association. Yet this is precisely the only evidence (or pretense) that the GF had for busting most of the BBSs involved. It is of course possible that this operation was a nationwide campaign planned by and executed by a collection of unthinkably stupid prosecutors. One thing is clear, however. We need to be careful that our interpretation of the fidobust is not colored by the American Operation Sundevil, which apparently *was* a case of ignorant prosecutors. As we shall see when we look at the alternative theories, Italy is a much different place. Theory 2: the Robber Baron theory Just as in the old American West the Robber Barons forced out small settlers, perhaps the Italian government was working on behalf of corporate interests to push out the smaller BBS's with the goal of making room for the larger corporations to establish interests on the electronic frontier. In the words of one of the CyberNet sysops: >In my opinion there are large economic lobbies interested in >resizing (if not eliminating) the amateur networks in order to give >space to their own telecommunications services (that in part >already exist and in part are being created). With the presence of >these free networks, they certainly won't succeed in occupying >large chunks of the market... {21} Who would these interests be? One candidate would surely be Silvio Berlusconi himself, the Italian Premier and the leading media mogul of Italy. According to trade magazines like _Advertising_Age_, Berlusconi's Fininvest corporation controls 40% of the Italian television audience, 33% of all periodical circulation, 18% of the book publishing market, and 16% of the newspaper circulation.{22} More importantly, Berlusconi's corporation controls 60% of the TV advertising revenue,{23} and 40% of all advertising revenues total in Italy!{24} Perhaps Berlusconi is uninterested in the electronic frontier and the potential future competition it poses for him, but that seems highly unlikely, particularly since Berlusconi's own publications routinely report on the electronic frontier, although often demonizing it. Surely Berlusconi could have seen a threat on the horizon to his near media monopoly. But would he be so low as to use his office to stamp out competition? It is interesting to note that when Berlusconi first announced his intention to run, the media trade papers assumed it was primarily to secure his media empire from anti-trust activities by the Italian government. For example as Jennifer Clark, of _Variety_ reported {25}, reported, "Common wisdom here holds that Berlusconi seeks only to protect his media empire which risks being dismembered through antitrust measures should the left win the elections." If Berlusconi ran to secure the future of his corporation, the BBS crackdown need not be viewed as an isolated incident, but can be seen as part of a larger campaign by Berlusconi to use his office to secure his future share of the media market. The evidence for this hypothesis is compelling Almost simultaneous with the BBS crackdown another much bigger "crackdown" was taking place. This one was aimed at silencing Berlusconi's only real opposition in broadcast television, the government sponsored networks RAI 1, 2, and 3. Here Berlusconi proposed that government support of these three television networks be eliminated -- effectively, that they be killed. According to the Berlusconi government, these networks were poorly managed; they were money losers. Of course the government ignored the fact that there was a conflict of interest.{26} With the elimination of RAI, Berlusconi would essentially have the Italian airwaves to himself. Berlusconi's threat created a firestorm of activity, with the President of the republic, Scalfaro, stepping in. The compromise solution? RAI could live if Berlusconi was allowed to install his own board of governors. Placed in this context it seems pretty silly to ask whether Berlusconi would be so low as to close down some obscure electronic bulletin boards to silence his political opposition. The bulletin boards could be closed virtually without protest. His move against RAI was in the papers for weeks, faced fierce opposition, and were morally just as reprehensible. Still, there are problems with the theory that Berlusconi was behind the action. For one, it seems like a very small thing for him to be concerned with -- particularly when he had much bigger concerns (like RAI). Some have argued that to suppose Berlusconi was behind the crackdown would be like accusing George Bush of being directly involved in Operation Sundevil. There is one difference of course. George Bush was not a media magnate. The situation is more as thought the secret service cracked down on wildcat oil drillers. Then we would be more apt to see the hand of George Bush. Berlusconi is not the only candidate Robber Baron in this scenario, of course. There are numerous corporate interests which may be primed to move into the electronic frontier, and cozy relationships between large corporations and the Italian government remain widespread. The biggest problem with the Robber Baron theory, however, is that it is not clear what the crackdown gained. The ranks of BBSs have been thinned, but at most by a third. Unless Operation Hardware 1 was merely the first act in a widespread campaign against amateur BBSs, the action made little sense. But of course the operation made no more sense as an action against software piracy. Theory 3: The Political Crackdown Theory This theory requires some background. From the end of World War II until the last year, Italy was continually ruled by a coalition headed by same political party -- the Christian Democrats. As so often happens in cases of perpetual power, corruption found a home, and eventually grew to engulf the government. In the case of Italy, it appears that most of the politicians were in the pocket of the mafia. And, as we now know, the corruption had completely engulfed the highest levels of government (from the socialist ex-prime minister Craxi to the Christian Democrat ex-prime minister and Senator for life Andreotti) as well as a number of business institutions (including, for example the Montedison corporation discussed above). For the most part, the average Italian considered the situation hopeless, and despaired of any solution. Several years ago, however, a number of Italians did start resisting the corruption, most dramatically the prosecutors Borsellino and Falcone, who initiated a number of mafia investigations and were assassinated in turn. The intended message was that prosecutors should go back to ignoring the mafia and government corruption. Just the opposite happened, however. Led by a prosecutor named Di Pietro, a group of prosecutors in Milano, soon to be known as the Mani Pulite (or Clean Hands) prosecutors, took up the call and pursued the anti-corruption investigations. By last summer, hundreds of politicians were under investigation -- it was becoming apparent that virtually the entire government was going to go to jail. In the 1993 local elections, Italy's political center collapsed. Thoroughly discredited, the Christian Democrats and Socialists won few votes -- electoral contests were being fought between the left and right wings. In some cases, the contests were between the neofascists (including Mussolini's grand-daughter) and the communists. A third party, the Lega Nord (originally the Lega Lombarda), also emerged, advocating that the Italian republic be split up into several smaller republics the north severing itself from the allegedly more corrupt south. It gained a number of seats in the house and senate. Then Silvio Berlusconi stepped onto the political scene. He was, in effect, Ross Perot, Ted Turner, Rupert Murdoch, and George Steinbrenner all rolled into one. First and foremost, he was a powerful media magnate, owning a number of television stations throughout Italy as well as controlling dozens of magazines, newspapers, and tabloids. His holding company, Fininvest, controlled businesses ranging from cinema to supermarkets, to financial services. Perhaps his most well-known holding however, was Milan AC, the best and most famous soccer team in Italy (he also held investments in a rugby team and two hockey teams).{27} Taking the name of his new political party from the slogan of Italy's world cup soccer team, "Forza Italia!", he projected an optimistic vision to a country that at times seemed on the verge of disintegration. Best of all, he had been completely out of politics and was hence viewed as uncorrupted. Here, it seemed, was an alternative to mafia-controlled Christian Democrats and Socialists, on the one hand, and to the Communists, and the Fascists on the other. Here, it seemed, was a new political center (albeit center- right). Berlusconi's party won big in the nationwide elections, and he was able to form a coalition government with the help of the Lega Nord and, disturbingly, the Alianza Nazionale -- the neofascist party. Despite his troubling bed-fellows the Italian media was for the most part supportive {28} (true, much of it was controlled by Berlusconi), and focussed more on what kinds of victory parties the right wing would throw than on the consequences of having genuine fascists in the government, or, for that matter, how someone with such extensive business dealings in Italy had avoided making illegal payoffs ("tangenti" as they're called in Italy). The genuinely disturbing issue was the large number of fascists in the government -- five members of the Alianza Nazionale held cabinet level positions. Nor have these fascist members of the government sitting silently in their offices. Commenting on the recent decline in the Lira, Labor Minister Clemente Mastella suggested that "New York's Jewish Lobby" behind the currency's fall, stating that "the presence of the National Alliance in the government worries New York's Jewish lobby... We should explain to Jewish high finance that Fini is increasingly distant from a nostalgic right."{29} No less disturbing were the remarks of Alianza Nazionale chairman Gianfranco Fini during celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the D-day invasion, arguing that D-day marked the death of Europe's cultural identity. While the non-Berlusconi controlled media fell asleep on the job, there were pockets of vocal opposition. Significantly, some portions of Italian BBS culture was on Berlusconi's case from day one. For example, number of CyberNet nodes offered strong opposition. No system, however, posed a greater threat than PeaceLink, with it's topics devoted to disarmament, international cooperation, conscientious objection, anti-mafia, peace movement, racism, human rights etc. More significantly, at the local level PeaceLink had waged a strong campaign against the mayor (sindaco) of Taranto. In the face of the mayor's local TV propaganda blitz, PeaceLink insisted that he renounce his past membership in the fascist party. According to the Political Crackdown Theory, it was simple to connect the dots after peaceLink was hit by the Guardia di Finanza. In the words of Alessandro Marescotti (Peacelink National coordinator) "... the current raid against our main node and data-bank clearly shows that in our country someone has an interest to shut down one of the very few organizations openly working against racism, war and mafia actions. Peacelink is dumb now, and so are the hundreds of volunteers,activists, journalists, citizens using its free services to make real changes in our society."{30} If it seems implausible to suppose that the BBS networks would even catch the attention of the Italian government, just consider the following frightening article which summarizes a report prepared by the Italian Secret Service.{31} From _la_Repubblica_, August 3, 1994, p. 16: >There is a new danger for Italian security... across the computer >networks travel information and disinformation known to pollute >public opinion, to create distrust and fear...According to a secret >service document: the phenomenon appeared worthy of more >thorough informative research... like some computer systems at the >international level which can be used as instruments for the >indirect acquisition of information. There is the risk that the >computer networks are becoming utilized not only for transmitting >news, BUT ALSO FOR THE ACQUISITION OF SECRET >INFORMATION, WHICH WOULD PUT THE NATIONAL >SECURITY IN PERIL. Moreover, organized crime may have >discovered the potential of computer systems and >telecommunication for their illicit activities." The Political Crackdown theory does not depend on Berlusconi himself having knowledge of the operation. It would be enough that by appointing a number of fascists to the government, Berlusconi helped create an atmosphere which the Guardia di Finanza was all to happy to exploit. Nevertheless there are problems with the Political Crackdown theory, chief among them being the fact that most of the targeted BBSs were not in fact political boards. But of course it is only fair to note that most of the boards targeted were probably not pirate boards either. If the Crackdown could have been caused by ignorant prosecutors looking for pirated software in the wrong places, by parity of reasoning it could have been caused by ignorant prosecutors looking for left-wing activity in all the wrong places. Realistically, given the available information, it is difficult to argue conclusively for any of the three theories (or combination of them). Hopefully more information will be forthcoming. If not, we may never know for sure what Operation Hardware1 was all about. Concluding remarks: Where do things stand? The Italian BBS community is gradually returning to normal. A number of sysops have had their systems returned, but dozens, perhaps as many as a hundred are still awaiting the return of their equipment, and many others are waiting while the prosecutors sift through over 100,000 confiscated disketts. (This could take some time!). On the bright side, the Italian BBS community has formed its own version of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, called ALCEI for the Associazione per la Liberta' nella Comunicazione Elettronica Interattiva (Association for Freedom in Electronic Interactive Communications). As sad as the whole story is, one of the saddest chapters is the utter failure of the electronic community in the United States to come to the aid of their friends in Italy. The distribution of information was spotty. There was no coordinated effort to help. And the great irony is that although the on-line community prides itself on the rapid dissemination of information, most members of that community, to this date, still know nothing about the Italian Crackdown. There really needs to be some permanent organization which can act quickly in situations like this -- an agency which can coordinate both information gathering and distribution, which can lend technical assistance, which can orchestrate electronic petitions and mail drives, and which can lobby government leaders. The Italian Crackdown was not the first crackdown. It certainly won't be the last. As groups utilize electronic communications for political action more and more, they will come under the scrutiny of angry governments more and more. Who will be there to help when the jackboots begin to fall? What we have to realize is that national boundaries mean little in cyberspace, that when part of the electronic community is silenced in Italy it is part of *our* community which has been silenced. To simply stand by and do nothing in these cases is morally wrong and it is pragmatically shortsighted. We need some structure in place - - some sort of Global Electronic Frontier Foundation which can step up and act immediately and decisively in this cases. We need all this, because "the next time" will be sooner than we think. Notes {1} These messages were first reprinted in _Decoder: _Rivista_Internazionale_Underground_ 9 (1994), p. 648. My translations. {2} Consider, for example, the case of Riccardo Iacobucci, operator of a seized Fido BBS: "They took away everything I had: 12 CD-ROMs, the PC with the BBS, the modem, many floppy disks, some of them in an old cardboard box, with very old backups on...another half-mounted PC with no hard disk...even a multiple socket" (from the electronic journal _Corriere_Telematico_, May 1994.). {3} The list of affected networks is from the list in _Decoder: _Rivista_Internazionale_Underground_ 9 (1994), p. 644. {4} Press release of the Nucleo Regionale di Polizia Tributaria della Guardia di Finanza di Torino (May 25, 1994). Translation posted to the WELL by Bernardo Parrella (berny@well.sf.ca.us). {5} ibid. {6} _La_Repubblica_ , June 18, p. 16. {7}Bruce Sterling (_The_Hacker_Crackdown_, New York: Bantam Books, 1992, p. 156). {8} In fact, this understates the involvement of PeaceLink, which was also involved in setting up helicopter and airplane relief flights for the sick and elderly in ex-Yugoslavia. {9}From an interview of Giovanni Pugliese by Luca Scarlini, host of "Cyberspace", 10:45 on Monday, June 6, 1994 on Nova Radio, Firenze (fm 101.5). The interview was transcribed by Andrea Sannucci (a.sannucci@agora.stm.it). My translation. {10} e-chat with Andrea Sannucci (a.sannucci@agora.stm.it) on the Senza Confine BBS, Macerata (0733-236370). My translation. {11} _Time_, June ?, 1994. {12}_Billboard_, May 22, 1993, p. 79. {13} BSA is a Washington D.C. organization whose members include Aldus Corp., Ashton-Tate, Autodesk Inc., Lotus, Microsoft Word, and WordPerfect Corp. {14}Janette Martin, "Pursuing Pirates", _Datamation_, Aug. 1, 1989, p. 41-42. {15} Ibid. {16} _La_Repubblica_ , June 18, p. 16. {17} See Sterling, op. cit.. {18} From the electronic journal _Corriere_Telematico_, May 1994. {19} ibid {20} ibid {21} e-chat with Andrea Sannucci, op. cit. {22} Michelle McCarter, "Berlusconi's Ad Strength Called into Question by EC." _Advertising_Age_, March 26, 1990, p. 30. {23} ibid. {24} Deborah Young, "Berlusconi Wins Battle in TV Antitrust War", _Variety_, April 20, 1992, p. 38. {25} Jan 31, 1994, p. 63. {26} Of course, given Berlusconi's vast financial empire, conflicts of interest are found at "every turn", according to _Business_Week_ May 2, 1994, p.35. {27} For a recent list of Fininvest holdings, see _L'Espresso_, August 12, 1994, p. 39. {28} See the article in _The_Nation_, April 25, 1994, p. 548. {29} Alan Cowell, "Remarks by a Cabinet member Adds to the Italian Prime Minister's Difficulties." _New _York_Times_, Aug. 13, 1994. {30} Source: Bernardo Parella (berny@well.sf.ca.us), in _CuD_. {31} The Italian Secret Service is an interesting story in its own right. SIFAR (the Servizio informazioni forze armante) when formed after World War II apparently rehired a number of members of Musolini's secret political police OVRA (Opera vigilanza repressione antifascismo) and has a tainted reputation ever since. According to some reports it collaborated with the CIA on a project to bug the pontifical library. For an interesting history of SIFAR and other Italian secret agencies, so Giuseppe de Lutiis, _Storia_dei_servizi_segretti_in_Italia_. (Politica e societa', # 40) Reprint. Rome: Riuniti, 1985. Appendix ----------------------------------------------------------- General Information About Electronic Frontiers Italy (ALCEI) ----------------------------------------------------------- =============== ALCEI =============== Electronic Frontiers Italy ------------------------- Associazione per la Liberta' nella Comunicazione Elettronica Interattiva (Association for Freedom in Electronic Interactive Communications) ALCEI - Electronic Frontiers Italy is an association of people dedicated to affirm and protect constitutional rights for "electronic citizens" as new communications technologies emerge. ALCEI is focused on the safeguard of freedom of expression and personal privacy for any person using electronic communication systems for personal, social, cultural, professional activities. ALCEI was founded in Milan at the end of July 1994 and is inspired by the principles and goals of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The main objectives of ALCEI - EF Italy are: - To ensure the protection of Constitutional rights for citizens using computer-based communication systems, researching and advising on current and future laws to ensure those rights; - To monitor, disclose and oppose any behavior intended to put restriction, censorship or suppression of free circulation of electronic communications and exchange of information and ideas, no matter how controversial. - To support, encourage and promote the development and use of electronic communications, in order to enable all citizens to have a voice in the information age. - To inform and educate the community at large about computer-based communication systems, emphasizing their responsible use and their positive consequences for our society. The activities of ALCEI - EF Italy include: - Organization of electronic mailing lists and public online conferences distributed throughout Italian systems for discussion on the above mentioned topics and related activities. - Research of current Italian and International laws regarding bulletin board systems and other online information services to set up guide- lines for providers of the these services, detailing their rights and responsibilities. - Production and distribution of information in different formats, including newsletters of various types for local media, general public and the digital community at large. - Establishment of public meetings and programs focused on the use of computer-based communications, in collaboration with local groups and individuals. - Regular exchange of information and experiences with similar International organizations and online communities. ALCEI - EF Italy is a non-profit, non-partisan organization. It is not tied to any political party or financial corporation. It does not accept any government grant. Its activities are completely supported by membership and personal contributions; its board and other active members are volunteers and receive no compensation. ---------------------------------------------------------------- MEMBERSHIP IN ALCEI - EF Italy ---------------------------------------------------------------- _Annual Membership Fees:_ Regular: 50.000 ItLire, US $ 30; Low-income/Student: 20.000 ItLire, US $ 15; Supporting, Groups, Organizations: 300.000 ItLire, US $ 200 ---------------------------------------------------------------- (Memberships paid during 1994 will be effective until December 31, 1995) Donations of any amount are greatly appreciated :-))) ---------------------------------------------------------------- For more information : **Outside Italy: ** ---------------------------------------------------------------- <---> (please leave this line, if you are redistributing this text) <---> ref: http://www.olografix.org/gubi/estate/archivio/inglese/CRACK1.TXT